EASA issues emergency AD for engine checks after Cathay A350-1000 fire

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The European Union Aviation Safety Agency on Thursday issued an emergency airworthiness directive requiring one-off inspections on Rolls-Royce engines powering Airbus A350-1000s.

The formal directive (PDF) offers clarity for operators after a Sept. 2 engine fire aboard Cathay Pacific flight 383 leaving Hong Kong. The aircraft landed safely 75 minutes after departure for Zurich, quickly prompting the start of a formal investigation by Hong Kong’s Air Accident Investigation Authority (AAIA) and the precautionary grounding of Cathay Pacific’s A350-1000 and A350-900 fleet for inspections. The EASA inspections focus specifically on the Trent XWB-97 engine, which is unique to the A350-1000 and EASA said that Cathay’s checks turned up “similar problems on other aircraft.” The South China Morning Post reported Sept. 4 that the incident engine had multiple deformed fuel lines.

The communications in recent days about the incident have created an awkward interplay between the engine maker and its customers, with Rolls-Royce referencing details shared by other participants in the investigation, including Cathay Pacific and EASA, instead of providing direct information to operators, multiple large A350 operators tell The Air Current. Rolls-Royce in an emailed statement to The Air Current earlier on Thursday said that because it is a party to the ongoing AAIA investigation “we cannot comment on the focus of the inspections, but note that EASA has publicly referenced high pressure fuel hoses.”

Rolls further pointed out that “Cathay Pacific has stated publicly that their inspections took 24 hours to cover their Trent XWB fleet, and that they expect all replacement parts to be installed in less than a week since the incident on flight CX383.” International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreements under Annex 13 specifically bar the public disclosure of investigative facts and analyses by parties to an investigation, although information can be shared if its “use outweighs the likely adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations.”

In the absence of formal guidance from EASA and Rolls and clarity on whether or not the issue affected both -900 and -1000 variants, A350 operators in Singapore, Japan and China proactively launched their own engine inspections in recent days. Singapore Airlines and Air China only operate the A350-900. 

EASA said there are 86 A350-1000s in service with airlines around the world.

The emergency AD, which takes effect on Sept. 9, is specific to the A350-1000 and ties compliance time to specific criteria. Airlines have three days to inspect fuel manifold main fuel hoses on engines that have accumulated at least 2,300 engine cycles or 18,500 hours since new and that have had two or more previous shop visits. EASA is giving operators seven days to comply for engines that have less than those stated cycles and hours, but have had a previous shop visit; and 30 days for those that do not fall in either category.

The component in question, The Air Current is told, is manufactured by Parker Aerospace for the Trent XWB-97, which is a heavily tailored, higher-thrust version of the original Trent XWB developed for the A350 program. According to a 2013 announcement, Parker supplies the “high-temperature hoses that channel fuel to the engine.” The one-time “visual and dimensional” inspection of the hoses can take place while the engine remains on wing as the suspect components are external to the engine casing. A spokesperson for Parker did not immediately respond to a request for comment.