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On the evening of Jan. 29, a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter collided with an American Airlines CRJ700 near Washington, D.C.’s Reagan National Airport (DCA), killing 67 people. The worst U.S. commercial air safety disaster in 16 years has raised questions about potential safety gaps created by airspace design, military flights in D.C., operations at DCA, air traffic controller staffing and much more.
The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board is holding a three-day investigative hearing to collect sworn testimony and further its analysis of the disaster. While no safety recommendations or final reports will be issued during the hearing, it will provide fresh insight into the facts and safety concerns that the NTSB has uncovered during its investigation to date.
Live updates from The Air Current’s editorial staff will follow below, bringing you the latest from nearly 25 hours of scheduled proceedings beginning at 9 a.m. ET on Wednesday, July 29, and scheduled to end at 2 p.m. ET on Friday, Aug. 1.
Friday, Aug. 1
5:50 pm: In response to a direct question as to whether there were unaddressed midair collision hazards at DCA prior to the accident, Frank McIntosh, the acting COO of the FAA’s air traffic organization, acknowledged that there were.
“I think there were some things that we missed, to be quite honest with you. Not intentionally, but I was talking about how certain facilities can drift into some culture. And I think a big thing was we were really dependent upon the use of visual separation between helicopters and IFR inbounds and outbounds. It’s not illegal. It’s a legal maneuver. But based on the complexity of the airspace and close proximity, I think those are some things that we definitely take a look at now, saying that we would have definitely shined a bigger magnifying glass onto that if we could go back in time.” — EH
1:50 pm: Board Member Inman reveals that the accident CRJ 700 was using older incandescent bulbs for all of its external lighting fixtures. Army witnesses said this may have altered the depth perception of the Black Hawk pilots — who were wearing night vision goggles — potentially changing where they believed the accident aircraft to be at the time since brighter LED lights from other sources can sometimes make dimmer lights appear farther away.
Not discussed in this particular exchange was the possibility that the Black Hawk pilots may have misidentified the aircraft ATC was referring to. — WG
12:56 pm: After a lengthy discussion of different collision avoidance systems, the FAA’s Neal Suchy told investigators that the accident Black Hawk helicopter would have received a traffic alert about 73 seconds before collision had it been equipped with Airborne Collision Avoidance System X for Rotorcraft (ACAS Xr), a higher fidelity version of the standard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) designed specifically for helicopters. U.S. Army Product Manager Lt. Col. Paul Flanigen said that the branch is currently undergoing component testing now and plans to begin installation of ACAS Xr on its rotorcraft fleet in 2027, pending allocated funding from Congress. — WG
10:59 am: Neal Suchy, the FAA’s Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System manager, told investigators that pilot compliance with resolution alerts (RAs) — in-cockpit collision warnings that generally require immediate action — is high during phases of flight above 2,000 feet, but drops significantly at lower altitudes.
Above 2,000 feet, Suchy said over 90% of pilots comply with RAs to slow or increase a vertical rate of descent, which make up over 60% of alerts given. RAs instructing a pilot to climb have a 65% compliance rate, and those to descend have a 70% compliance rate.
Below 2,000 feet, pilots are often in critical phases of flight like take-off or landing, and Suchy said compliance with RAs instructing a pilot to climb drops to 30% (he did not give a rate for descent RAs). He noted that this could be attributed to the pilot’s statutory authority to ignore the alert if they obtain a visual of the “threat” aircraft and determine that safe flight is possible without complying. — WG
9:01 am: Good morning from the third and final day of this investigative hearing. Since the third panel took up all of yesterday’s session, panel four and five will both be heard today — meaning the proceedings will most likely go all day. Panel four will focus on the potential role that collision avoidance technology played in the accident, and panel five will dive into the safety management systems at each relevant organization. — WG
Thursday, July 31
5:34 pm: Expect delays and scheduling issues at DCA to get worse before they get better. Njuen Mandi Chendi, an FAA D.C.-area ATC traffic management officer, told investigators that changes to the airport’s arrival rate are “in the works.” She said the change would most likely be a further reduction in arrivals given current restrictions on the use of runway 33 when helicopter traffic is present, a policy instituted in the wake of the crash. NTSB Chair Homendy also reiterated a point that the staffing at DCA tower is worse than it was on the day of the accident, exacerbating the airport’s ability to safely accommodate more traffic. — WG
4:45 pm: Former DCA operations manager Clark Allen revealed to investigators that the helicopter control and tower control ATC positions were combined on the day of the crash because the controller working the helicopter position was training someone and needed to debrief their session. Allen reiterated that he believed the helicopter controller could have been reinstated if deemed necessary, but they were not. — WG
3:52 pm: When asked by Board Member J. Todd Inman about what he thinks the NTSB may have missed so far in its inquiry, Potomac radar facility air traffic manager Bryan Lehman said he believes many of the current issues at DCA trace back to his denied request to reduce the arrival rate at the airport in 2022 and 2023. Lehman confirmed that the FAA has not accepted that proposal to this day. (See today’s 12:14 p.m. update for more details on this proposal.)
Lehman added that he thinks the agency’s voluntary safety incident reporting system, the Air Traffic Safety Awareness Program (ATSAP), is “obsolete… ineffective, and it reduces accountability of individuals,” but didn’t offer specifics beyond that. Lehman said that he has tried to tell this to “anyone who would listen” but that it has “fallen on deaf ears.”
“I [used to] go around and I would say that we need to go to ATSAP… 2.0. Since the crash, 2.0 won’t do. We need to completely redesign the program or get rid of it and come up with a better program.” — WG
3:12 pm: One focus for investigators this afternoon has been conflict alerts (CAs) in the ATC tower, which are audible and visual alarms that go off when two aircraft come within a designated vertical or lateral distance of each other. Clark Allen, the DCA operational supervisor at the time of the accident, said that about 50% of these CAs are considered nuisance alerts, meaning they do not present an actionable conflict, for example because corrective action was already taken. Dr. Kenneth Allendoerfer, manager of the FAA’s human-systems integration branch at its technical center in Atlantic City, said during the hearing he concurred with that estimate. — WG
1:07 pm: In October 2018, the DCA air traffic control tower (ATCT) was downgraded from a level 10 facility to a level 9 facility — a designation used by the FAA to measure how busy and complex an ATC facility is. The higher the facility level, the more controllers are paid (the jump from level 9 to level 10 comes with the greatest pay difference, up to as much as $20,000).
James Jarvis, who formerly oversaw quality control for the FAA’s eastern ATC region, told investigators that he understood the downgrade took place because the overlying Potomac approach and departure facility wanted to be upgraded from a Level 11 to a Level 12 designation, according to investigative documents. Jarvis said the FAA accomplished this by counting D.C.’s helicopter traffic exclusively under the Potomac ATC facility — bumping up its traffic to the level 12 threshold, but consequently demoting DCA’s to a level 9.
The NTSB summarized the rest of the conversation as follows: “DCA ATCT quickly realized that a mistake had been made and formalized an appeal. The Traffic Count team realized that a mistake had been made and agreed that DCA ATCT was still running the previously counted traffic level. However, since DCA ATCT had been removed from the Level 10 buffer, DCA ATCT would not be returned to the Level 10 status. PCT was allowed to retain the Level 12 designator.” — WG
12:14 pm: In 2022, Potomac radar facility manager Bryan Lehman said that he had noticed more delays and traffic “compacting” during certain hours of the day at DCA. Lehman’s team proposed a lower arrival rate in response, but said that he was told “we were not going to go in that direction” by FAA managers, citing the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 which ultimately added more flight slots to the airport.
That proposal never made it to agency leadership, but the FAA’s traffic management officer for the Washington district said during the hearing the arrival rate information also indicated runway 33 was not being utilized as much as it could have, resulting in outreach to airlines notifying them of the additional capacity. Although no FAA witness said definitively that there was a noticeable uptick in runway 33 usage — the runway that the accident CRJ was due to land on earlier this year — one witness added that the airlines responded by saying “of course, if we have capacity, let’s use it.” — WG
12:02 pm: In response to a question about DCA tower’s “just get it done” culture where controllers feel pressured to use every tool available to push the maximum amount of traffic possible, Potomac radar facility manager Bryan Lehman said that the capital region facilities use “non-standard” traffic techniques to work the uniquely complex airspace, adding, “We take pride in it. But I will say that at a certain point it’s too much.” — WG
11:37 am: The hearing revisited a point that was not clear at the conclusion of yesterday’s testimony: whether the routes and altitudes depicted on helicopter route charts are recommended or mandatory. NTSB investigator Brian Soper introduced new information that the letter of agreement between DCA air traffic control and the U.S. Army’s 12th Aviation Battalion required the battalion to maintain charted routes and altitudes when operating near DCA, and Rick Dressler from Metro Aviation pointed out that language on the Baltimore-Washington helicopter route chart indicates that clearance into Class B airspace along a charted route implies altitudes as depicted. However, the FAA’s Nick Fuller provided a more nuanced interpretation based on the fact that helicopter route charts are for visual flight rules operations.
“The discussion [yesterday] was not meant to say that helicopter operators don’t need to follow the routes and can just go willy-nilly around the Class Bravo,” Fuller said, while reiterating that there are no defined widths for helicopter routes and the language around altitudes is not as clear on every chart.
Fuller said the FAA is working to close this “gap” with its national helicopter working group, but in the meantime, “if an aircraft drifts off the bank of the river and drifts toward the center of the river, how could we therefore violate that pilot for doing something to remain clear of clouds or avoiding traffic? It’s not to say that these helicopter routes shouldn’t be followed, but it’s just to say that as an air traffic controller, if you are depending on that route width definition for separation or the altitude for separation, you need to take positive control and provide clear, consistent instructions, consistent with the phraseology in Class Bravo airspace that says via route, maintain altitude while in Bravo airspace.” — Elan Head
10:36 am: Staffing in the DCA control tower at the time of the accident has been central to this investigation. Shortly after the crash, the New York Times reported that the combining of the helicopter control and the local control positions was “not normal” on the night of the accident, and other outlets reported general staffing deficiencies at DCA. PSA Airlines pilots interviewed by investigators also said the controller seemed busy that night, according to investigative documents.
Former DCA tower operations manager Clark Allen conversely defended the tower’s staffing during the hearing, and said there were enough controllers available to staff both positions separately if the operation required it despite them being combined for longer than usual that day. In interviews with investigators, the tower controller during the accident said that they were “fine” working the combined position, though there was one point they “thought about asking for it, but … as soon as I was thinking about it, you know, I got rid of a few helicopters.”
The NTSB’s final report will provide a more definitive judgment regarding whether or not the staffing was truly adequate, as stakeholders seem to be using different metrics to reach different conclusions. That said, investigative documents show that as of the day before the crash, DCA was staffed to about 89% of its older FAA target and 83% of its newer joint-FAA-union target, both above the 80% needed to be considered “healthy.” — WG
9:42 am: Investigators have quickly arrived on the limitations of “see-and-avoid,” the blanket term used to encompass separation from other aircraft using visual methods. Prior to the crash, the Black Hawk had requested and was approved to use pilot-applied visual separation with the accident CRJ — a type of see-and-avoid procedure that is often used in D.C. airspace but is less typical elsewhere, investigators said. Pilot-applied visual separation has unique clearance requirements based on aircraft type and shifts responsibility to maintain separation to the pilot, unlike the typically used controller-applied visual separation, where air traffic controllers are still responsible for primary conflict avoidance.
Rick Dressler of Metro Aviation said that many of his company’s pilots often decline to use visual separation and are particularly wary of relying on the pilot-applied procedure because they “don’t have a predictable way to continue visual tracking of aircraft” as routes change. — WG
8:26 am: Good morning from the hearing room where day two is set to begin in about 30 minutes. Today, the Board will focus on air traffic control procedures and training as well as the potential role collision avoidance technology may have played in the accident. Expect heavy scrutiny to continue to fall on the FAA regarding both their role on the air traffic side as well as how they have regulated the Army’s scarce use of ADS-B technology in D.C. airspace. — Will Guisbond
Wednesday, July 30
6:51 pm: Chair Homendy briefly became angry towards the end of day one after a back-and-forth between Board members and the FAA’s Katie Murphy regarding what the NTSB viewed as the agency’s failure to implement recommendations to add cautionary warnings or “hot spots” to helicopter route charts.
According to Homendy, a request was made at an FAA symposium “to include something on the chart that said: ‘Pilots, use caution for runway 3-3 departures when DCA is in a north configuration,’ which [at the time of the accident, the airport] was.”
Murphy responded that the agency did not implement the hot spot recommendation “due to the fact that they are not within the VFR aeronautical charting standard.” When asked if the FAA offered an alternative, the official pointed to a separate meeting hosted twice a year as an avenue for stakeholders to make chart recommendations.
In a similar line of inquiry, Member Inman asked Murphy why charts for LAX caution pilots of “intense helicopter activity” but charts for DCA did not have that caution note before this accident.
“They did not ask for it,” Murphy said. “But they did, did they not?” said Inman. “They asked for ‘hot spots,’” Murphy countered.
After reciting the 2023 recommendations of the DCA Helicopter Working Group, Homendy momentarily lost her cool.
“I’m not looking for an answer right now because honestly, I don’t get it. Every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that. Yet … you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in the tower was saying there was a problem. But you guys are pointing out, ‘Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.’ … Fix it. Do better.” — BGG
5:42 pm: Chair Homendy, Member Inman, NTSB staff and FAA deputy chief operating officer Nick Fuller just concluded a lengthy exchange, sparring over the particulars of whether and how the FAA was “fully forthcoming” with all Board information requests as a part of this investigation. Homendy claimed the agency “dumped” thousands of pages of information about which controllers were on duty at DCA during the accident on the Board the Friday before this hearing despite her staff requesting it for months. The FAA said it complied and was managing hundreds of requests for information “outside of our normal processes and procedures.” — WG
5:32 pm: In a contentious string of questioning from Chair Homendy, FAA witnesses revealed that the DCA tower has had 13 air traffic managers since 2013 — five in the last five years and three in the last two years. Homendy asked how managers are supposed to reliably raise safety issues and evaluate airspace changes if there has been so much turnover. “My only response to that is that it is defined in the FAA order 7210.3,” said Katie Murphy, who oversees aeronautical charting at the FAA. “Is this where it would be defined?” Homendy asked, holding up a printed version of the nearly 700-page document. “I believe so,” Murphy responded. — WG
4:40 pm: An FAA spokesperson told The Air Current that the agency is looking into prescribing specific widths to helicopter routes across the country. In hearing testimony, representatives for the regulator described routes on the nation’s eight existing helicopter route charts, which do not have firm lateral boundaries, as “recommended paths” because they are shown on visual flight rules charts with the expectation that helicopters will deviate as necessary to remain clear of clouds and maintain obstruction clearance. Although FAA witnesses said it was the agency’s goal to add these new lateral parameters, the spokesperson said the plan was preliminary and had not gone through a safety risk management review. — WG and Elan Head
4:16 pm: Military aircraft are operating in D.C.’s congested Class B airspace with ADS-B off “to this day,” said Rick Dressler of Metro Aviation. PAT25, the accident Black Hawk, and other military helicopters do not use ADS-B reporting systems when flying operational missions like the training flight on Jan. 25. That exemption for the Army was part of a longstanding agreement between the Department of Defense and the FAA. “It adds an unacceptable layer of complexity and risk to this system,” Dressler said, even before considering the simultaneous use of vision-inhibiting night vision goggles. The traffic collision avoidance devices used by many civil aircraft including air medical and law enforcement helicopters are “completely useless if aircraft don’t show up because they’re not broadcasting, so it adds an enormous risk.” – JO
3:17 pm: Army officials told investigators that pilots are expected to be able to maintain their assigned altitude within 100 feet either above or below. “I don’t think there’s any expectation that we can maintain an altitude … plus or minus zero,” said Army standardization officer David Van Vechten. “There’s too many limiting factors … I think the reasonable expectation is that being off on altitude by 50 or 70 feet one way or the other would not lead to a catastrophic event.”
Rick Dressler, aviation site manager for medical services company Metro Aviation, asked to address that comment in an exchange that hints at how the Army assesses risk. “In the civilian side, that is a hard altitude for us,” he said. “We do not accept a plus or minus of 100 feet in the DCA route structure … that is unacceptable, and how none of our civilian members are trained in the D.C. airspace. So, a 200-foot altitude or 300-foot altitude is a hard ceiling for us.” — WG and BGG
3:10 pm: FAA officials told NTSB that before the crash users of the D.C. airspace had identified helicopter route four — which the accident Black Hawk was flying on — as having a potential conflict when runways 15 and 33 are in use. At the time, FAA was told changes could not be made without impacting government and security missions within the national capitol region, the agency officials said. Besides the alterations made after January’s crash, route four had not been changed since 1991, they added. — WG
2:46 pm: Clark Allen, who at the time of the accident was a manager at DCA tower, told investigators that controllers have “had trouble” understanding military aircraft in the past. He said civil aircraft generally operate newer aircraft with better equipment, typically including dual radios, and therefore are easier to understand. Asked if there are specific operators within the DCA Class B airspace that are particularly challenging when it comes to communication quality, Allen said, “We’ve had trouble in the past with the Air Force and the Army.” — WG and Brian Garrett-Glaser
2:36 pm: During a short interview on the sidelines of the hearing, Tim Lilley, father of Flight 5342 first officer Sam Lilley, told The Air Current that yesterday’s meeting between DCA crash families and U.S. Army officials was a “good first step,” but added that “we have a long way to go” with the branch. Up until that meeting, Army officials had not met with families of the crash victims, having been criticized by families for their slower-than-desired response to calls to improve communications. — WG
2:23 pm: In an interview with NTSB investigators, the DCA tower controller who was working the two accident aircraft that evening said he “could tell something was off” in the moments before the crash. Though the controller said that he was unable to tell visually if the helicopter was too high, he did say he could generally tell if an aircraft wasn’t where it was supposed to be. He told investigators he was primarily focused on looking outside, not at the radar systems in the tower that have received scrutiny in recent months for their potentially inaccurate altitude readings. — WG
1:49 pm: A central line of questioning for the first panel focused on how the Army is testing its remaining fleet of older Black Hawks like the accident helicopter (UH-60L, known as the “Lima” model) for potential faulty barometric altimeters that could present incorrect information to pilots. Initial discovery of the potential for fleet-wide altitude issues was made during May test-flights with Lima Black Hawks involving the NTSB.
Chair Homendy told reporters during a lunch break that she is “not satisfied” with how the branch has conducted that testing so far, as well as with its plan to communicate further issues to pilots. The branch stated it is aiming to put out an alert to pilots by Sept. 15 if an issue exists, and will make a determination whether a policy change needs to be implemented via a longer-term revision of the aircraft’s flight manual. — WG
12:41 pm: Member Inman reveals that the entire Board completed simulations of the accident helicopter’s route using night vision goggles, adding that he felt it was a difficult flight regime that can involve distractions including cross-checking flight instruments as well as the iPad or tablet used as an electronic flight bag all while one’s field of vision is reduced. Army representative Kylene Lewis responded that during this type of flying she would not want a pilot looking at their iPad to reduce distractions, even though that device contains charts and may also show ADS-B traffic. — WG
11:43 am: In the months leading up to the accident, a PSA summary of Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) alerts showed five individual activations during the airline’s approaches to DCA airport from Sept. 13, 2024 to just one the day prior to the Jan. 29 mid-air collision. That flight on Jan. 28 while approaching from the north was advised by ATC of two Black Hawks while descending to 3,000 feet. A resolution advisory (RA) guided the crew to level off. “Crew reacted accordingly, and ATC also gave a vector away from traffic.” The report estimates that the helicopters were 600 feet below and one to two miles away from the PSA flight at the time of the RA. — Jon Ostrower
11:14 am: The day after the crash, an FAA air traffic control review team found that “potential systemic training issues” had been identified at DCA. The agency said that “a misconception may exist that the helicopter routing structure is procedurally separated with arrivals and departures,” meaning controllers would think they have more buffer room when working mixed helicopter and jet traffic. The review also found that on the day of the accident, the approach control facility failed to adhere to an agreed-to four mile horizontal separation minimum between aircraft, forcing arrivals to be spaced closer together, something DCA controllers said is “routinely not adhered to.” — WG
10:28 am: According to an FAA memo posted on the accident docket, the Potomac-area ATC facility manager opposed a provision in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 that added additional flight slots to the airport. “The proposal to add additional flights, through expansion of the DCA slot program, would exacerbate current operational challenges,” the memo says. “Increasing the overall number of operations at DCA will likely result in longer arrival/departure banks, increased traffic at low altitudes, increased fuel consumption, increased probability for airborne holding, and augment missed approaches.” The FAA’s air traffic organization added that reports indicating DCA could accommodate additional flights were “flawed.” — WG
10:01 am: As a part of post-accident altitude tests on three representative Black Hawk helicopters, the NTSB found that the height shown on the pilots’ barometric altimeters was significantly lower than actual height above mean sea level (MSL). Recorded altitude on the accident helicopter was about 80 to 100 feet lower than height above MSL. — WG
9:40 am: As a part of an 11-minute animation of the accident, the NTSB is playing the air traffic control audio from the event as well as live surveillance video of the two aircraft colliding in a chilling reminder of the severity of this crash. The NTSB provided time for spectators to leave the room before it was played if they desired. — WG
9:24 am: Initial review of cockpit instrumentation documentation for the Black Hawk helicopter indicates that the wreckage of the left hand side radar altimeter (which shows height above the terrain directly below it) indicated 250 feet while the right hand side indicated 295 feet. Preliminary information from the NTSB had previously indicated the helicopter was above its maximum permissable altitude of 200 feet, and that there was a discrepancy between what both pilots were seeing. — WG
9:17 am: U.S. Army Brigadier General Matthew Braman, former Director of Army Aviation, is present as a part of the branch’s investigative group, confirming earlier reporting from The Air Current which said he would appear at the hearing despite having been reassigned as Chief Marketing Officer. — WG
9:01 am: The hearing has started with an announcement from Board Member Tom Chapman, who said he is recusing himself from all proceedings because he still receives flight benefits from American Airlines as a part of an arrangement with a former employer. Board Member Alvin Brown was removed earlier this year by the Trump Administration for unknown reasons, leaving this investigative board with just three of the usual five members. — WG
9:00 am: Good morning from L’Enfant Plaza in Washington, D.C. where NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy has gaveled in day one of the investigative hearing. Today, the board will convene two panels — one in the morning to discuss the accident Black Hawk’s systems and another in the afternoon focused on D.C.’s Class B airspace and the design of its various helicopter routes. — Will Guisbond
